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[The state of global marine fisheries is of common concern to humankind. The emergence and 
persistence of noncompliant fisheries practices conveniently (though sometimes confusingly) 
labelled ‘Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing’ (‘IUU fishing’), is of particular concern 
for the international community, regional fisheries management organisations and coastal states. 
A number of factors have contributed to the emergence of IUU fishing. Historical and economic 
developments have shaped the evolution of modern fisheries and whilst not always desirable, 
they are influences that must be accepted and understood. Factors facilitating the persistence of 
IUU fishing tend to be primarily legal in nature. Hence there is scope to address these matters 
with the aim of creating a legal environment where IUU fishing becomes less attractive. It has 
been acknowledged that there is no one single solution to the problem of IUU fishing. It is 
argued that this is because there is no one single contributing factor. Rather, noncompliant 
fishing is a product of the development of the law of the sea, in particular over the past two 
centuries. The law of the sea is itself a product of the political, economic and sometimes legal, 
interests of states.] 
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I INTRODUCTION 
It is estimated that up to 78 per cent of marine capture fisheries are 
overfished.1 Given that the global marine catch increased from 18 million tonnes 
in 1950 to 92 million tonnes by 2001,2 overfishing is not surprising. 
Responsibility cannot rest solely upon high seas fishing states nor coastal states, 
since a number of interrelated factors have contributed to the situation. 
Developments such as the extension of coastal state sovereign rights over living 
and non-living resources in the water column and seabed to a limit of 200 
nautical miles, and the corresponding displacement of fishing fleets from what 
had hitherto been regarded as high seas, had a marked impact on the regulation 
and practice of marine fisheries. Further, rapid advancements in technology 
which improved vessel efficiency, significant capital investment in the fishing 
industry and an over capacity in the global fishing fleet must also be considered 
when evaluating influences on marine fisheries. Marine fisheries are 
characterised by too many vessels — and efficient ones at that — pursuing fewer 
fish in a greatly reduced area.3 When the cumulative impact of these historical 
and economic factors is assessed, one appreciates the profound way in which the 
nature of fishing, particularly in the latter half of the 20th century, has been 
altered. This shift is comparable to a transformation from a ‘trade to a science’.4 
Therefore, it is not unexpected that in an environment of competition for 
fewer resources, a phenomenon called illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing 
— now commonly termed ‘IUU fishing’5 — emerged, and has become more 
prominent in the last decade of the 20th century. The term is one of broad 
application, encompassing a suite of activities with the common aim of avoiding 
regulation, be they on the high seas, in areas regulated by Regional Fisheries 
Management Organisations (‘RFMOs’) or in coastal state waters. The operators 
and owners of IUU fishing vessels have become increasingly sophisticated in 
their planning and execution of fishing expeditions. Tactics such as sharing 
intelligence, reflagging to non-members of RFMOs, changing the vessel name 
                                                 
 
1
 Food and Agriculture Organization, State of the World Fisheries and Aquaculture (2000) 
The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture Part 1 <http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/ 
003/X8002E/x8002e04.htm#P0_0> at 1 October 2004. The Food and Agriculture 
Organization is hereafter referred to as ‘FAO’.  
 
2
 Ibid; FAO, State of the World Fisheries and Aquaculture (2002) <http://www.fao.org/ 
docrep/005/y7300e/y7300e04.htm#P3_47> at 1 October 2004.  
 
3
 See Jacques Diouf, FAO Director General, ‘Too Many Vessels Chasing Too Few Fish’ 
(Press Release, 1 October 2001) <http://www.fao.org/WAICENT/OIS/PRESS_NE/ 
PRESSENG/2001/pren0158.htm> at 1 October 2004. He stated: ‘Consequently today there 
are too many vessels chasing too few fish’. 
 
4
 David Hunter, James Salzman and Durwood Zaelke, International Environmental Law and 
Policy (2nd ed, 2002) 674. 
 
5
 See discussion in Part II of this article. 
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and call sign, and creating elaborate corporate webs to conceal ownership are 
indicative of an emerging corporate element in IUU fishing. Furthermore, IUU 
fishers have exploited limitations in the international law of the sea which were 
not apparent when the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea6 was 
negotiated. 
The historical and developmental factors which have shaped the evolution of 
modern marine fisheries are primarily nonlegal in nature, the principal drivers for 
change being economic and political self-interest. Whilst nothing can be done to 
turn back the clock and reorganise the framework within which marine fisheries 
are regulated, it is nevertheless helpful to understand the combination of factors 
that have driven state practice. It is interesting to observe that the factors 
facilitating the persistence of IUU fishing, however, are principally legal in 
nature. Hence there is scope to address these factors with the aim of eliminating 
legal loopholes exploited by IUU fishers. 
This article examines the range of factors which have contributed to the 
development of IUU fishing and, arguably, facilitated its persistence. It is 
divided into four parts. Part II examines the use of the term ‘IUU fishing’ and 
reviews why IUU fishing is now a global problem. Part III reviews historical and 
nonlegal factors that have affected marine fisheries. Part IV identifies and 
examines legal limitations in international law exploited by IUU fishers. The 
analysis supports the conclusion that, given the gradual development of 
conditions favourable to the conduct of IUU fishing, there is no one single 
solution which can be utilised to eliminate its practice. Indeed it was noted at the 
close of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
Workshop on IUU fishing in April 2004, that the solution to IUU fishing will 
require a ‘multi-pronged approach’.7 An understanding of the factors 
contributing to the development and facilitating the continued existence of IUU 
fishing will assist in the formulation of the scope of such an approach. Lastly, 
Part V identifies some possible solutions or strategies for the deterrence of IUU 
fishing. 
II UNDERSTANDING IUU FISHING 
IUU fishing as a term is broadly defined. It encompasses a range of behaviour 
principally categorised according to wherever the fishing takes place. The 
Commission established under the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources8 is credited with being the first RFMO to give formal 
recognition to the problem of noncompliant fishers and to coin the phrase ‘IUU 
fishing’.9 The 1997 Report of the Standing Committee on Observation and 
Inspection noted that vessels flagged to CCAMLR members had been observed 
                                                 
 
6
 Opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1834 UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994) 
(‘UNCLOS’). 
 
7
 OECD, Workshop on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing Activities — Key 
Observations and Findings by the Workshop Chairs (2004) 2 (‘OECD Workshop’). 
 
8
 Opened for signature 20 May 1980, 1329 UNTS 47 (entered into force 7 April 1982) 
(‘CCAMLR’). The Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
is hereafter referred to as the ‘CCAMLR Commission’. 
 
9
 CCAMLR Commission, Report of the Sixteenth Meeting of the Commission (27 October – 
7 November 1997) [8.7]–[8.13] <http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/E/pubs/cr/97/cc-xvi-all.pdf> at 
1 October 2004. 
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fishing illegally within CCAMLR waters10 and the Exclusive Economic Zones 
(‘EEZs’) adjacent to the Prince Edward Islands (South Africa), Crozet Islands 
and the Kerguelen Islands (France) and the Heard and McDonald Islands 
(Australia).11 The CCAMLR Commission also noted the increasing incidence of 
fishing within the Convention Area by non-contracting states. This activity was 
classified as ‘unreported and unregulated fishing by non-Members’.12 
Whilst the Standing Committee on Observation and Inspection and the 
CCAMLR Commission made a distinction between illegal fishing, and 
unreported and unregulated fishing, the international community has partially 
blurred the distinction. Instead, ‘IUU fishing’ has been used as a generic 
description of fishing activity which ‘undermines efforts to conserve and manage 
fish stocks in all capture fisheries’.13 It is true that IUU fishing activities may 
overlap. For example, illegal fishing is also unreported by its nature. However, it 
is important to recognise that the term is often used to describe specific situations 
such as fishing within coastal state waters without coastal state permission, or 
fishing within RFMO waters by a flag vessel of a state party in contravention of 
the relevant RFMO conservation measures. In this context, the term illegal 
fishing would be more accurate to describe the factual situation.14  
This article draws on several examples from the practice of illegal fishers 
detected and arrested within Australian waters adjacent to the Heard and 
McDonald Islands. In this context the specific term ‘illegal fishing’ is applicable. 
On other occasions when commenting generally on the practice of noncompliant 
fishing, the generic term ‘IUU fishing’ is employed. In the main, the historical 
nonlegal factors reviewed in Part III have created an environment where the 
emergence of IUU fishing has been almost inevitable. However, the legal factors, 
which are examined in Part IV, principally relate to illegal fishing, since 
unreported and unregulated fishing occurs on seas governed by RFMOs or the 
high seas and consequently is not governed by rules relevant to the enforcement 
of coastal state jurisdiction.15  
A IUU Fishing as a Global Problem 
The persistent and global nature of IUU fishing was noted in a statement 
made at the close of the FAO’s 25th Committee on Fisheries (‘COFI’) in March 
                                                 
 
10
 CCAMLR, above n 8, art 1, defines the Convention Area in terms of its application to 
‘Antarctic marine living resources of the area south of 60 degrees south latitude and the 
Antarctic marine living resources of the area between that latitude and the Antarctic 
Convergence which form part of the Antarctic marine ecosystem’.  
 
11
 CCAMLR Commission, Report of the Sixteenth Meeting of the Commission, above n 9, 
annex 5 [1.5]. 
 
12
 Ibid annex 5 [1.20]. 
 
13
 The Committee on Fisheries, FAO, International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and 
Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (2001) [1] <http://www.fao.org/ 
DOCREP/003/y1224e/y1224e00.HTM> at 1 October 2004 (‘IPOA-IUU’). 
 
14
 Ibid. The IPOA-IUU does define the illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing separately: 
at [3.1]–[3.3]. 
 
15
 Although it is noted, as mentioned above, that unreported fishing can occur within coastal 
state waters, this is usually when linked to illegal fishing. 
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2003. It was acknowledged by the members of COFI that ‘IUU fishing and its 
impact on resource sustainability is a matter of international concern’.16 
The international community has galvanised itself behind the cause of 
deterring and eliminating IUU fishing. In December 2003, five states agreed to 
participate in the OECD Taskforce to tackle IUU Fishing.17 To this end, in April 
2004 the OECD hosted a workshop on IUU fishing attended by approximately 
120 experts. The aim of the workshop was to gather information on the extent of 
IUU fishing and to identify the economic and social drivers for its existence.18 It 
was noted, inter alia, that the impact of IUU fishing is not restricted to specific 
habitats. Tuna, which is classed as a highly migratory species,19 is also 
significantly affected. More recently, 84 FAO member states met in late June 
2004 to discuss methods of strengthening international cooperation to combat 
IUU fishing.20 Recommendations included increased cooperation on trade 
controls, and the creation of a central FAO database of information on IUU 
fishing activities.21  
The impact of organised IUU fishing has been felt particularly in the Southern 
Ocean and within the EEZs located adjacent to a number of sub-Antarctic 
islands. The remote location of these EEZs, coupled with the freezing and 
mountainous seas encountered in the Southern Ocean, magnifies the difficulties 
experienced by coastal state authorities in regulating their maritime zones and 
deterring illegal fishers. Excepting the pockets of coastal state jurisdiction, the 
Southern Ocean south of 60 degrees south latitude is governed by the 
Commission established by the CCAMLR.22 Beyond this, the ocean is considered 
high seas. However, states who are not members of CCAMLR regard all of the 
Southern Ocean, with the exception of the remote EEZs, as high seas.23 The 
                                                 
 
16
 FAO, ‘Strong Support for Firmer Action against IUU Fishing’ (Press Release, 3 March 2003) 
<http://www.fao.org/english/newsroom/news/2003/14660-en.html> at 1 October 2004. 
 
17
 Ian Macdonald, Minister for Fisheries, Forestry and Conservation, Australia, ‘Illegal Fishing 
under Pressure from International Action’ (Press Release, 10 December 2003) 
<http://www.mffc.gov.au/releases/2003/03272m.html> at 1 October 2004. The states are 
Australia, Chile, Namibia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. 
 
18
 OECD, OECD Workshop, above n 7, 2. 
 
19
 Eight species of tuna are listed in UNCLOS, above n 6, annex I. 
 
20
 FAO, ‘Countries Debate Strategies for Managing Fleet Capacities and Combating Illegal 
Fishing’ (Press Release, 1 July 2004) <http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/news/2004/ 
47649/> at 1 October 2004.  
 
21
 Ibid. These methods are mentioned further in Part V of this article. 
 
22
 See generally CCAMLR, above n 8. 
 
23
 The validity of remote EEZs such as the Heard and McDonald Islands EEZ has been raised 
by Judge Vukas in two cases before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(‘ITLOS’): see The Monte Confurco Case (Seychelles v France) ITLOS Case No 6 
(Unreported, Declaration of Judge Vukas, 18 December 2000) (‘Monte Confurco Case’); 
The Volga Case (The Russian Federation v Australia) ITLOS Case No 11 (Unreported, 
Declaration of Vice-President Vukas, 23 December 2002) (‘Volga Case’). See Chris 
Masters (Reporter) and Lin Buckfield (Producer), ‘The Toothfish Pirates’, ABC Four 
Corners Program, 30 September 2002 (‘Four Corners’), where one of the officers on board 
the Lena when she was apprehended in February 2002 is on the record as having stated: ‘We 
… the fishermen … do not understand the Australian waters as Australian waters’. In this 
context, the dissenting judgement of Vice-President Vukas might be viewed as supportive of 
claims by IUU fishermen that all areas of the Southern Ocean are high seas, including those 
regions of purported coastal state jurisdiction. If this argument were taken to its logical 
conclusion, one would argue that there can be no illegal fishing in the Southern Ocean. 
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application of differing legal regimes concerning the Southern Ocean makes it 
imperative to be precise when employing the term IUU fishing. 
It is not within the scope of this article to examine the extent to which coastal 
states and RFMOs have generally been plagued by IUU fishing.24 Nonetheless, it 
is sufficient to say that there are reports of IUU fishing in varying levels of 
severity, in relation to several species of tuna, reef sharks in the Western Central 
Pacific, oceanic redfish in the North-East Atlantic Ocean and lobster in waters 
adjacent to Oman.25  Furthermore, in terms of illegal fishing for toothfish in the 
Southern Ocean EEZs and unreported and unregulated fishing within CCAMLR 
waters, the illegal trade has been described as ‘probably more profitable than 
running drugs or smuggling people’.26 
B IUU Fishing in the Southern Ocean 
Concerns were first raised in 1993 about illegal fishing activities in the 
Southern Ocean. The CCAMLR Scientific Committee reported that toothfish 
stocks around South Georgia Island may have been depleted to approximately 30 
per cent of the original stock levels.27 Signs of active management appear in the 
agenda for the 1995 CCAMLR annual meeting.28 The Working Group on Fish 
Stock Assessment reported that ‘[t]he unreported catch was either of the same 
order or higher than the reported catch’.29 It was also observed that over the 
previous four years, the reported catch represented just 40 per cent of the 
estimated total catch harvested from within sub-area 48.3 (South Georgia Island) 
and adjacent areas.30  
It is difficult to verify estimates of the quantity of toothfish harvested by the 
IUU fishing industry. However, IUU fishing as a percentage of the total catch of 
toothfish within the Convention Area is significant. Table 1 below illustrates the 
extent of the problem raised by IUU fishing. Whilst the peak of IUU fishing 
appears to have passed for the time being, it remains a significant management 
problem for the CCAMLR Commission. In any case, the estimates in Table 1 for 
the 2001–02 fishing year suggest that IUU fishing, at least for toothfish fishing, 
is on the rise once more. 
                                                 
 
24
 There are many papers addressing this area, particularly the existence of IUU fishing in the 
Southern Ocean: See, eg, David Agnew, ‘The Illegal and Unregulated Fishery for the 
Toothfish in the Southern Ocean and the CCAMLR Catch Documentation Scheme’ (2000) 
24 Marine Policy 361; Denzil Miller, Eugene Sabourenkov and Natasha Slicer, 
‘Unregulated Fishing — the Toothfish Experience’ in Michael Richardson and Davor Vidas 
(eds), The Antarctic System for the 21st Century (forthcoming 2004); Judith Swan, FAO 
Fisheries Department, FAO Fisheries Circular No 996: International Action and Responses 
by Regional Fishery Bodies or Arrangements to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (2004) FAO Doc FIPL/C996.  
 
25
 Swan, FAO Fisheries Circular No 996, above n 24, 29–30. 
 
26
 Bruce Montgomery, ‘A Fishy Business’, The Weekend Australian (Sydney, Australia), 
26 October 2002, 28. 
 
27
 Scientific Committee for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Report of 
the Twelfth Meeting of the Scientific Committee (25–29 October 1993) [3.34]. Note the word 
‘may’ was used as there was in 1993 and remains today, uncertainty about exact population 
levels. See also Agnew, above n 24, 362. 
 
28
 Scientific Committee for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Report of 
the Fourteenth Meeting of the Scientific Committee (23–27 October 1995). 
 
29
 Ibid [4.16]. 
 
30
 Ibid [4.17]. The ‘Fishing Season’ referred to in Table 1 runs from 1 December – 30 November. 
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TABLE 1: CCAMLR ESTIMATES OF IUU TOOTHFISH FISHING (IN TONNES) 
WITHIN THE CONVENTION AREA FROM 1996–97 TO 2001–0231 
 
Fishing 
Season 
1996–97 1997–98 1998–99 1999–00 2000–01 2001–02 
Estimated 
IUU Catch 
32 673 15 106 5868 7644 8802 11 812 
Total Catch 45 071 28 424 19 643 25 308 22 527 24 834 
IUU Catch as 
% of Total  
73% 53% 30% 30% 39% 48% 
 
During discussions at the 1997 CCAMLR meeting, many member states 
expressed concern for the growing incidence of IUU fishing within the 
Convention Area. The European Community (‘EC’) representative stated that the 
EC ‘considered that [the] CCAMLR [Commission] faced a major challenge 
resulting from the blatantly illegal and/or non-notified fishing activities’.32 The 
CCAMLR Commission concluded, at the 1997 meeting, that fisheries 
management is aggravated by the fact that  
illegal, unregulated fisheries and unreported catches today exceed reported fishing 
by a factor several times over. No less aggravating is the fact that more than half 
of the vessels presumed to engage in illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing 
fly the flags of CCAMLR Member States. That underlines the urgent need for 
CCAMLR and CCAMLR Member States to bring their own house in order.33  
The CCAMLR Commission has adopted a number of conservation measures 
specifically aimed at eliminating or at least deterring IUU fishing within the 
Convention Area, having noted in 2003 that ‘current levels of IUU fishing are 
unsustainable’.34  
                                                 
 
31
 Miller, Sabourenkov and Slicer, above n 24: Table 1 of this article is reproduced from Table 
4 of the chapter.  
 
32
 CCAMLR Commission, Report of the Sixteenth Meeting of the Commission, above n 9, 
[5.2]. 
 
33
 Ibid [5.8]. 
 
34
 CCAMLR Commission, Report of the Twenty-Second Meeting of the Commission 
(27 October–7 November 2003) [8.3] <http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/E/pubs/cr/03/all.pdf> at 
1 October 2004. While it is not within the scope of this article to review the measures 
adopted under the CCAMLR, see generally Agnew, above n 24; Miller, Sabourenkov and 
Slicer, above n 24; Erik Jaap Molenaar ‘CCAMLR and Southern Ocean Fisheries’ (2001) 
16 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 465, for an overview of Conservation 
Measures. 
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III HISTORICAL AND ECONOMIC FACTORS AS INFLUENCES ON THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF MARINE FISHERIES 
A The Creation of the EEZ and the Displacement of  
High Seas Fishing Vessels  
Although now it is simply a fact of history, the impact on marine fisheries of 
the high seas fishing fleet relocating beyond the newly declared EEZs is an 
important factor in understanding IUU fishing. In addition to the inevitable 
impact upon resource management, the reduction and restriction of high seas 
freedoms challenges the fundamental belief in the freedom of those seas — a 
freedom which has long been championed by seafaring states — principally for 
the purpose of protecting navigational and fishing rights.  
The enclosure of vast tracts of sea within declared EEZs reduced the area of 
high seas significantly. It is estimated that approximately 35 per cent of the 
world’s oceans are now enclosed within coastal state waters.35 The creation of 
EEZs therefore excluded high seas fishing states from waters that had, until 
1982, been regarded as traditional high seas and thus open to the exercise of the 
right to the freedom of fishing. Whilst art 62 of UNCLOS does cast an obligation 
on coastal states to give other states access to the surplus allowable catch in 
circumstances where they do not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable 
catch within their EEZ, the practical effect was the exclusion of high seas fishing 
states from participation in these fisheries. The high seas fishing states and their 
many vessels were forced to seek catches from waters further than 200 miles 
from the coast. 
Given that more than 95 per cent of the marine catch comes from seas within 
coastal state jurisdiction,36 one could be excused for dismissing as unimportant 
the remnants of the marine fisheries located in the high seas. However, the 
recognition of EEZs and the enforcement of associated coastal state rights shifted 
the focus of high seas fishing 200 nautical miles out to sea, resulting in the 
concentration of an unprecedented fishing effort in a smaller resource pool. High 
seas fishing states continued to exercise their rights in these adjacent high seas 
areas, albeit subject to the limitations within arts 116–19 of UNCLOS. 
Catch estimates from the FAO reflect the impact of this shift in focus upon 
previously under fished stocks. Catches of oceanic species almost tripled from 
three million tonnes in 1976 to eight and a half million tonnes in 2000.37 
Specifically, a striking example of the impact of the relocation of the high seas 
                                                 
 
35
 Jean Carroz, ‘Institutional Aspects of Fishery Management under the New Regime of the 
Oceans’ (1984) 21 San Diego Law Review 513, 513. 
 
36
 Ibid. See also Robin Rolf Churchill and Alan Vaughan Lowe, The Law of the Sea 
(2nd ed, 1988) 232; Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (‘DOALOS’), Office 
of Legal Affairs, UN, The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea — A Historical 
Perspective (1998) Overview — Convention & Related Agreements <http://www.un.org/ 
Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm> at 1 October 2004. 
 
37
 FAO, State of the World Fisheries and Aquaculture (2002) The State of World Fisheries and 
Aquaculture Table of Contents <http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y7300e/y7300e00.htm> at 
1 October 2004. Whilst the FAO noted it is difficult to assess the development of fishing on 
the high seas because reports to FAO of marine catches make no distinction between those 
taken within EEZs and those taken on the high seas, the analyses of the FAO catch database 
of 116 oceanic species items (epipelagic and deep water species that occur principally on the 
high seas) revealed the increase. 
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fishing fleet was the commercial extinction of the Central Bering Sea pollock 
during the 1980s. In 1977, both the former USSR and the US declared extended 
fisheries jurisdictions into the Central Bering Sea. Prior to this date the US had 
claimed only three miles under the authority of a territorial sea and the former 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics a 12 mile territorial sea.38 The resulting 
expansion of state sovereignty left only 50 000 square miles of high seas in the 
875 000 square mile Bering Sea. The enclave of remaining high seas was named 
the ‘Donut Hole’ due to the appearance of a ‘hole’ of high seas surrounded by 
the Soviet and American fishing zones on redrawn maps. A number of high seas 
fishing states had traditionally fished in the Bering Sea, including Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, the People’s Republic of China and Poland. These states 
were gradually excluded from the newly-declared US and USSR fishing zones as 
the coastal states began phasing out foreign fishing allocations.39  
The consequences of this revised delimitation underscore the impact of the 
relocation or displacement of the high seas fishing fleet. The traditional high seas 
fishing states turned their attention to the previously unfished waters of the 
‘Donut Hole’. Recorded pollock catches rose rapidly from negligible amounts at 
the close of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(‘UNCLOS Conference III’) to 1.4 million metric tonnes within a decade.40 
Figure 1 below illustrates the intensity of fishing and the rapid decline in 
recorded catches as the pollock stocks were fished to the brink of collapse. 
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FIGURE 1: Pollock Catches in the Bering Sea ‘Donut Hole’41 
  
                                                 
 
38
 David Balton, ‘The Bering Sea Doughnut Hole Convention: Regional Solution, Global 
Implications’ in Olav Stokke (ed), Governing High Seas Fisheries: The Interplay of Global 
and Regional Rules (2001) 143, 144. 
 
39
 Evelyne Meltzer, ‘Global Overview of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: The 
Nonsustainable Nature of High Seas Fisheries’ (1994) 25 Ocean Development and 
International Law 255, 283. 
 
40
 Ibid 286. 
 
41
 See ibid 287, for the raw data upon which Figure 1 is based. 
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The displacement of the high seas fishing fleet increased fishing effort on 
smaller numbers of fish, resulting in increased competition amongst states, and 
the emergence of IUU fishing. The need to regulate the new fisheries, such as 
that of the pollock, became apparent when fish populations collapsed. 
Furthermore, the high seas fishing states objected to attempts by coastal states to 
regulate high seas fisheries (including straddling fish stocks and highly 
migratory fish stocks), arguing that coastal state interests had already been 
advanced at the expense of high seas fishing states through the recognition of the 
200 mile EEZ.42  
B Capital Investment in Marine Fisheries 
Significant capital investment in marine fisheries resulted in rapid advances in 
technology and increases in the size of the world fishing fleet. In turn, this has 
meant that more fish are being harvested in less time, by a greater number of 
vessels. The impact of overfishing, excess fleet capacity, and overcapitalisation 
in world fisheries was noted in 1995 at the Rome Consensus on World 
Fisheries.43  
During the late 19th century and the 20th century, the fishing industry 
benefited from great advances in technology. These advances have been 
described in terms of transforming fishing from a ‘trade to a science’.44 Fishing 
vessels became mechanised in the late 1800s, which allowed trawl nets to be 
wound in within 30 minutes, whereas previously it had taken three hours by 
hand.45 This enabled nets to be recast more frequently, thereby taking advantage 
of short patches of good weather, with a corresponding increase in the number of 
catches that could be made. Other developments included the introduction of 
nylon nets, outboard motors, sonar and tracking devices, and improvements in 
communications.46 Improvements in technology also led to improved boat design 
and navigational equipment, allowing fishers to travel further afield, in greater 
safety, to search for new fish populations.47  
During and immediately after World War II, high powered ships, drag nets 
and on board freezers transformed fishing vessels into huge factory ships, 
thereby revolutionising the fishing industry. The ability to process fish on board 
provided vessel operators with the capacity to freeze the catch at sea and enabled 
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1161, 1164. 
2004] Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 11 
  
voyages to extend over many months. These improvements in technology 
significantly improved the cost-benefit ratio of each fishing voyage.48 
By 1958, however, the international community noted that years of 
unregulated fishing had caused serious consequences for marine living resources. 
The States Party to the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living 
Resources of the High Seas49 recognised that 
the development of modern techniques for the exploitation of the living resources 
of the sea, increasing man’s ability to meet the need of the world’s expanding 
population for food, has exposed some of these resources to the danger of being 
over exploited[.]50 
Rather than self-regulating to adjust catch levels to account for the rapid 
advancements in fishing efficiency, high seas fishers have tended to intensify 
their efforts. This is because the principle of freedom of the seas has led to a 
situation where the oceans are owned by no one and managed by no one. The 
presumption arose amongst fishers and their flag states that any fish left behind 
would surely be harvested by other fishers.51 Hence there has been no incentive 
to manage catch levels to ensure the long-term sustainability of the renewable 
resources, or to delay harvests according to population fluctuations. 
Consequently, far greater quantities of fish have been hauled from the oceans 
than Vattel,52 almost two centuries ago, or Huxley,53 less than 70 years earlier, 
could ever have imagined. Whilst previously the oceans might have weathered 
intensive fishing utilising primitive methods, the systematic harvesting facilitated 
by new technologies has left fish nowhere to retreat. The impact on non-target 
species including sea birds has also increased significantly.54 
The effects of more efficient harvesting techniques have been compounded by 
an excess capacity in the world fishing fleet. Dr Diouf, the Director-General of 
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the FAO, has captured the essence of this threat to marine fisheries in the 
following statement:  
The Great Oceans are indeed exhaustible. Despite the fact that the majority of all 
resources are now fully exploited, access to these resources remains open … in far 
too many fisheries around the world. Consequently today there are too many 
vessels chasing too few fish.55  
Between 1970 and 1990, the global fishing fleet doubled from 585 000 to 
1.2 million commercial fishing vessels.56 In 1998, a report compiled by two 
former FAO Executives on behalf of Greenpeace called for a 50 per cent 
reduction in the world industrial fishing fleet.57 This report refers to large-scale 
industrial vessels which are defined as being more than 24 metres in length58 and 
measuring more than 100 gross tons.59 Of the estimated 3.5 million fishing 
vessels worldwide, approximately 38 000 or just 1.7 per cent of vessels met these 
criteria. Notwithstanding this, they accounted for almost 60 per cent of the total 
capacity of global fishing vessels.60 The size of the global fishing fleet has since 
been revised to 4.1 million decked and undecked vessels.61  
Fleet capacity remains a significant issue. The OECD Taskforce has noted 
with concern that ‘excess capacity in fisheries in OECD countries can lead to a 
spillover of capacity into IUU fishing activities’.62 It has also been observed that 
efforts to reduce fleet sizes, for example through the reduction of subsidies, can 
trigger an increase in IUU fishing activity as the displaced vessels seek 
alternative fishing areas.63  
Furthermore, the situation is compounded by government subsidies which 
have a long and troubled association with marine fisheries. Subsidies can 
‘artificially elevate profit’64 such that economic indicators may fail to detect that 
a particular fishery is no longer economical. As such, ‘fishing continues beyond 
reasonable limits and stocks can be decimated’.65 The negative impact of 
subsidies on marine fisheries has been addressed at a number of international 
conferences66 and was specifically targeted in the FAO International Plan of 
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Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity.67 Whilst the plan is voluntary, it 
calls on FAO member states to ‘assess the impact of subsidies which contribute 
to overcapacity’.68  
The impact of increasing numbers of industrialised vessels has been 
catastrophic for many fish species. It is now widely accepted within the scientific 
community that ‘ecological extinction caused by over-fishing precedes all other 
pervasive human disturbance to marine ecosystems, including pollution, the 
degradation of water quality and climate change’.69  
The advancements in technology and the resulting improved efficiency of 
vessels, coupled with a greater number of fishing vessels, led to increases in the 
recorded catch of global marine fish stocks. The increase between 1948 and 1995 
is depicted in Figure 2 below. Although the intervals between the years in Figure 
2 are not uniform, the rapid rise in catch levels is evident. Between 1950 and 
1995, the global marine catch increased from 18 million tonnes to 84.3 million 
tonnes.70 This represents an increase of 368 per cent. 
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IV LEGAL LIMITATIONS ON THE ELIMINATION OF IUU FISHING 
A Flag State Control  
Fishers seeking to maintain profits in an environment of increased 
competition for fewer resources have increasingly resorted to illegal fishing, be it 
in coastal state waters or within areas of high seas regulated by RFMOs. 
Unreported and unregulated fishing has also increased. One factor in the 
avoidance of regulation is the practice of reflagging vessels. This involves 
vessels previously flagged to a state party reregistering with a non-member state, 
to avoid regulation by the RFMO. The practice of reflagging has persisted 
because the requirements for flag states to exercise control over their vessels are 
weak and subject to manipulation, as well as being based on state consent. 
1 The Practice of Reflagging  
An increasingly prevalent practice in the fishing industry is the concentrated 
ownership of fishing vessels by a handful of nations. It is a byproduct of the 
increased corporatisation of the commercial marine fishing industry. In seeking 
to avoid regulation, fishing vessel owners have developed a practice of changing 
flag status to find those flag states with minimum regulation over registered high 
seas fishing vessels. From 1991–95, 82 per cent of new vessel registrations were 
lodged with just 14 nations.72 More recent figures from the 2002 FAO State of 
World Fisheries and Agriculture Report support this trend.73 Of the vessels 
reflagged in 2000, 36.3 per cent were with known flag of convenience states.74  
It should be noted that the term ‘flag of convenience’ is used throughout this 
article to refer to those states which do not require their flagged vessels to fish in 
compliance with RFMOs’ measures, or to fish in a responsible manner as 
required under UNCLOS, the FAO’s Agreement to Promote Compliance with 
International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on 
the High Seas75 or the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 1995.76 
The term refers to the fact that vessels have typically been deliberately 
deregistered from member states of relevant RFMOs and reregistered with 
non-member states. Hence, the vessel operators and their owners can avoid 
compliance with RFMO conservation and management measures by which they 
might otherwise be bound through their registration with member states. 
Whilst the term ‘flag of convenience’ is still employed, new terminology is 
emerging which recognises the reality that these vessels are registered with 
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noncompliant states. The term ‘flag of noncompliance’ has been adopted by the 
CCAMLR Commission and Scientific Committee and is used in the identification 
of fishing vessels for the CCAMLR IUU vessel database.77  
In 2000, the Lloyd’s list of shipping indicated over 1000 fishing vessels were 
registered with Belize, Honduras, Panama, St Vincent and the Grenadines and 
Equatorial Guinea, all known as flag of convenience states.78 Other states with 
open registers include: the Seychelles, Sao Tome and Principe, Netherland 
Antilles, Togo and Russia.79 Another estimate suggests that up to 1200 flag of 
convenience fishing vessels are operating in the high seas without effective flag 
state control.80 Estimates by the FAO in 2002 suggest that there are no fewer 
than 1500 vessels classified as flag of convenience vessels.81 
The variation in the data on flag of convenience registrations sheds light on 
the nature of the emerging IUU fishing industry and the difficulties created for 
fisheries management bodies. The very nature of a flag of convenience means 
that vessel owners wish to avoid both detection and any obligations to comply 
with conservation and management measures, hence the lack of detail available 
about such registrations. Adding to the difficulties encountered by coastal states 
and RFMOs in exercising authority over IUU fishing vessels is the fact that flag 
of convenience vessels often fly no flag or have the vessel name and number 
painted over.82  
The problem of reflagging has been addressed at a number of international 
fora, including the 1992 Conference on Responsible Fishing in Cancún, Mexico 
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and the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (‘UNCED’).83 
The requirement for the flag states to exercise jurisdiction and control over its 
flag ships was recognised during UNCLOS Conference III. Articles 91 and 94 of 
UNCLOS reflect the extent to which the international community was able to 
agree on the nature of flag state responsibility. The examination below concludes 
that under current international law, flag state responsibility is a conceptual ideal 
rather than a reality. 
2 The ‘Genuine Link’ Requirement 
Whilst international law does seek to impose obligations on flag states to take 
responsibility for their flagged vessels, it has proven somewhat ineffective. 
Indeed it has recently been observed that ‘[i]nternational law appeared to 
sidestep the issue of “genuine link”’.84 The obligations on flag states in UNCLOS 
have been accepted by 145 states and are reiterated in the FAO Compliance 
Agreement and the FAO Code of Conduct.85 Flag state responsibility is 
addressed in art 94 of UNCLOS which requires every state to ‘effectively 
exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social 
matters over ships flying its flag’. In terms of the right to grant flag status to 
vessels, art 91(1) of UNCLOS requires that ‘every State shall fix the conditions 
for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, 
and for the right to fly its flag’. In addition, art 91 provides that ‘there must exist 
a ‘genuine link’ between the State and the ship’. There is however no definition 
of what amounts to a ‘genuine link’.  
The basic obligation to exercise effective control over flagged vessels has 
become a principle of customary international law.86 However, the terms of arts 
91 and 94 of UNCLOS are very general in nature and unhelpful in creating a 
benchmark against which the exercise of flag state responsibility can be gauged. 
Similarly, it is difficult to prove the absence of a ‘genuine link’ or flag state 
control. 
The FAO Compliance Agreement specifically targets the practice of 
reflagging and reiterates the UNCLOS requirement for a ‘genuine link’ between 
vessel and state. Article III(2) requires that a state be satisfied, ‘taking into 
account the link that exists between it and the fishing vessel concerned’, that it is 
able ‘to exercise effectively responsibilities under the Agreement in respect of 
that fishing vessel’. Whilst the FAO Compliance Agreement is in force, it has 
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only been ratified by 28 states.87 Thus, whilst this Agreement will potentially 
increase flag state responsibility by introducing, inter alia, obligations not to 
provide authorisation to vessels which have undermined the effectiveness of 
international conservation and management measures,88 its success is dependent 
upon greater acceptance and implementation by the international community. 
The FAO Compliance Agreement is also silent on a definition of the term 
‘genuine link’. However, the question has been considered by ITLOS in The M/V 
Saiga (No 2) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v Guinea).89 On 28 October 
1997, a Guinean patrol boat arrested an oil tanker, the Saiga, near the Guinean 
EEZ.90 One of the many issues canvassed during both the M/V Saiga (No 1) 
Case and the M/V Saiga (No 2) Case was the legitimacy of the ‘hot pursuit’ 
conducted by Guinea under art 111 of UNCLOS. In this context, the Tribunal 
considered an objection made by Guinea to the admissibility of the application 
for prompt release by the flag state. Guinea’s objection was premised on the 
submission that no ‘genuine link’ existed between the Saiga and St Vincent and 
the Grenadines.91  
Guinea argued that the flag state obligations to exercise jurisdiction over 
registered vessels imposed by art 94 of UNCLOS must be fulfilled to establish 
the ‘genuine link’ required under art 91. If this were to be accepted, it was 
further submitted that in the absence of the exercise of any such jurisdiction, no 
link between the ship and the flag state could exist. Hence, the claims made by St 
Vincent and the Grenadines could be dismissed on the ground that there was no 
‘genuine link’ between the flag state and the Saiga.92 In essence, Guinea argued 
that the existence of a ‘genuine link’ was a prerequisite for the recognition of 
nationality. 
The Guinean submission is an attractive one in terms of qualifying the nature 
of flag state responsibility. However, the 1958 Convention on the High Seas and 
UNCLOS do not support such a proposition. Article 5 of the Convention on the 
High Seas, which was the predecessor to arts 91 and 94 of UNCLOS, states that 
‘[t]here must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship: in particular, 
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the State must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administering 
technical and social matters over ships flying its flag’. 
Article 5 of the Convention on the High Seas did not retain the 
recommendation made by the International Law Commission when formulating 
the 1956 Draft Articles on the Law of the Sea. Article 29 of the Draft Articles 
had stated that ‘for the purposes of recognition of the national character of the 
ship by other States, there must exist a genuine link between the state and the 
ship’.93 The absence of a reference to nationality in arts 91 and 94 of UNCLOS 
led the Tribunal, in the M/V Saiga (No 2) Case, to conclude that the  
provision of the Convention on the need for a genuine link between a ship and its 
flag State is to secure more effective implementation of the duties of the flag State 
and not to establish criteria by reference to which the validity of the registration of 
ships in a flag State may be challenged by others. The Tribunal also stated that 
there is nothing within the wording of art 94 to permit a state which discovers 
evidence indicating the absence of proper jurisdiction and control by a flag state 
over a ship to refuse to recognise the right of such a ship to fly the flag of that 
state.94  
This observation reinforces the customary international law principle of flag state 
authority. 
Whilst the Tribunal’s conclusion is correct in law, it does highlight the limited 
value of current flag state responsibilities. In practice, the requirement in 
UNCLOS that a ‘genuine link’ exist between state and ship has not been effective 
in fostering flag state responsibility. The number of flag of convenience 
registrations is increasing, and the links between flag states and their vessels can 
be tenuous.95  
Another factor mitigating against state responsibility for flagged high seas 
fishing vessels is the now commonplace practice for the vessels to be crewed by 
nationals of many states, although Spanish nationals do predominate.96 
Invariably, the nationality of the crew has no link to the flag state of the vessel. 
In some respects, the ineffectiveness of the requirement for a ‘genuine link’ 
between flag state and vessel is as much an example of the limitations of 
international law as an example of the corporatisation of IUU fishing. Corporate 
entities with access to international funds and expertise have entered the global 
marine fishing industry. The act of reflagging to states, which exhibit a lax 
attitude to the regulation of their registered high seas fishing fleet, is essentially a 
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tactical commercial decision. The lack of prescription within UNCLOS on the 
nature and scope of flag state obligations has been exploited by the IUU fishing 
industry to its full advantage. 
B The Principle of Pacta Tertiis 
A basic rule of customary international law, pacta tertiis nec nocent nec 
prosunt, dates back to Roman law.97 This principle is based on the premise of 
sovereign equality amongst all states. It was codified in the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties,98 and has been described as a general rule ‘so 
well established that there is no need to cite extensive authority for it’.99 The 
principle, as stated in the VCLT, is that ‘[a] treaty does not create either 
obligations or rights for a third State without its consent’.100 
The very nature of international law as a consensual arrangement between 
states101 is premised upon this fundamental principle.102 However, the operation 
of the pacta tertiis rule also exposes a weakness in international law. States may 
choose not to accept an obligation undertaken by a majority of states, sometimes 
benefiting from their noncompliance, as well as undermining attempts by the 
international community to regulate state practice. 
In practical terms, this means that regional efforts to manage high seas 
fisheries can be undermined either by noncompliant third party states or by states 
who do ‘sign up’ to the relevant convention but who exercise their right to avoid 
compliance with selected measures. This latter possibility is a feature of many 
regional fisheries conventions. Contracting parties to CCAMLR may notify the 
Commission of their intention not to comply with a conservation measure within 
90 days of receipt of notification of any new measure.103 This is notwithstanding 
that the party assumedly supported the measures’ adoption, as measures on 
matters of substance are to be adopted by consensus. By way of example, until 
the 2003 meeting of CCAMLR Parties, Canada had repeatedly notified the 
CCAMLR Commission of an inability to comply with the Catch Documentation 
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Scheme.104 This stance was maintained notwithstanding diplomatic pressure to 
comply and approaches from other CCAMLR member states. Other regional 
fisheries conventions with similar provisions to opt out of conservation measures 
include the Convention on Future Multilateral Co-operation in the Northwest 
Atlantic Fisheries105 and the Convention on the Conservation and Management 
of Pollock Resources in the Central Bering Sea.106  
In the context of identifying strategies for the elimination and deterrence of 
IUU fishing, the consent of flag states is required to impose tighter, more 
effective flag state controls. Flag state consent is also required for the effective 
implementation of the Catch Documentation Scheme and the Vessel Monitoring 
System (‘VMS’) — both of which have been adopted by CCAMLR — in 
addition to any further limitations on the freedoms of high seas fishing states. 
The only aspect of behaviour falling under the IUU banner which can be 
challenged in the absence of flag state consent is illegal fishing. Coastal states 
have the authority to regulate fishing activities within the EEZ. However the 
enforcement of that authority is governed, inter alia, by arts 73 and 111 of 
UNCLOS. As the following examination indicates, it is through the application 
of these articles that high seas fishing vessels are seeking to maximise their 
interest. 
C Striking the Right Balance under Article 73 of UNCLOS  
1 Applications for Prompt Release: An Abuse of Process? 
Article 73 of UNCLOS allows a coastal state to exert its sovereign rights to  
explore, exploit, conserve and manage the living resources in the exclusive 
economic zone, taking such measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest and 
judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the laws and 
regulations adopted by it in conformity with this Convention. 
In the event that a foreign vessel is arrested within a coastal state’s EEZ, the 
arresting state has an obligation under art 73(2) to release the vessel and crew 
promptly upon the ‘posting of a reasonable bond or other security’.  
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There have been a number of applications for prompt release under art 292 of 
UNCLOS in the short period since the inception of ITLOS.107 Under this art, 
where a State Party has detained a vessel flying the flag of another State Party 
and it is alleged that the detaining state has not complied with the provisions of 
UNCLOS for the vessel’s prompt release, the question of release may be 
submitted, inter alia, to ITLOS. During the most recent application for prompt 
release, the respondent state, Australia, raised concerns about the pressure on 
flag states to make such applications and the utilisation of these applications as a 
means of ‘evading and undermining relevant coastal state enforcement 
measures’.108  
Both New Zealand and France supported the Australian submission via 
diplomatic notes. New Zealand observed rightly that ITLOS has a role to play in 
discouraging the scourge of illegal fishing activity in the Southern Ocean.109 
France made an even stronger statement noting that ‘[t]he French authorities are 
deeply concerned by the fact that the frequent resorting to Article 292 of the 
Convention on the Law of the Sea may be an obstacle to sustained efforts aimed 
at combating illegal fishing’.110 
The judgments delivered by ITLOS in the prompt release cases to date do not 
evince full support or sympathy for the untenable position of many coastal 
states.111 Indeed it has been observed that their earlier judgments delivered in 
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2000, ‘gave rise to some apprehension’112 from the viewpoint of coastal states 
‘as to how their practice in setting bonds would withstand similar scrutiny by the 
ITLOS’.113 
2 The Tribunal’s View of a Reasonable Bond  
The precise ambit of the required ‘reasonable bond or security’ has been the 
subject of a number of recent judgments delivered by ITLOS. Through a 
majority of judges, ITLOS initially adopted a rather narrow view of what  
constituted a reasonable bond114 and the factors that may be taken into account in 
settling the amount of the bond. In the Camouco Case and the Monte Confurco 
Case, the majority demonstrated an inclination to take into account, amongst 
other criteria, the value of the catch on board when the vessel was arrested.115 
However, not all members of the Tribunal embraced this approach. Judge Jesus 
was critical of the consideration in the Monte Confurco Case, stating ‘the 
majority decision was unwise to have taken the value of the fish seized as part of 
the bond, when domestic legislation makes it subject to confiscation’.116 
The Tribunal altered its initial view on this very important point in its most 
recent decision. In the Volga Case, ITLOS decided that the value of the seized 
catch on board a seized vessel is not relevant to the calculation of the bond by the 
coastal state authority.117 This shift in thinking is a significant fillip for coastal 
states. If the value of the catch is to be held not relevant in terms of adjusting the 
amount of bond to be posted, those vessels arrested with sizeable catches would 
potentially enjoy the benefits of their illegal and unsustainable practices via a 
proportionately reduced bond. 
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3 Excluding Non-Financial Conditions  
Whilst the decision in the Volga Case has been proclaimed as a success by 
Australia,118 one aspect of the judgment can only be viewed as decidedly 
unfavourable. It has become the practice of Australian authorities when setting 
the bond under art 73(2) of UNCLOS, to include a requirement that a VMS be 
installed on the vessel before its release. The terms of the bond typically stipulate 
that the VMS is to remain operational until the conclusion of proceedings against 
those members of the crew charged under the Fisheries Management Act 1991 
(Cth). It is, in essence, a ‘good behaviour bond’. 
The majority in the Volga Case concluded that such a condition, together with 
the inclusion of a dollar amount to guarantee compliance, could not be included 
within the words ‘bond or financial security’ under art 73 of UNCLOS.119 The 
majority adopted a narrow and literal approach to the wording in art 73 finding 
that the reference to ‘bond or security’ must be limited to a bond or security of a 
financial nature.120 In considering whether the VMS was bond or security for 
good behaviour, ITLOS found that art 73(2) is intended for the purposes of the 
release of arrested vessels and not to be used for the deterrence of future repeat 
offences.121  
This decision is an unwelcome one in terms of preserving a balance between 
coastal state interests in the living resources in the EEZ and state interests in their 
flagged vessels. It has the potential to undermine attempts by coastal states to 
work legitimately, within the confines of international law, to bring illegal 
fishers and the owners of the fishing vessels, to account. 
4 A Broader Interpretation 
The judgments of Judge ad hoc Shearer and Judge Anderson, both of whom 
dissented on this point, are more persuasively reasoned deliberations. For 
example, Judge ad hoc Shearer stated that the words ‘bond or financial security’ 
should be given a  
liberal and purposive approach in order to enable the Tribunal to take into  
full account the measures — including those made possible by modern 
technology — found necessary by coastal States … to deter by way of judicial 
and administrative orders the plundering of the living resources of the sea.122 
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Judge Anderson formed a similar view, stating:  
In Article 73, paragraph 2, the context is clearly not the financial meaning of 
‘bond’ as a simple deed. Rather, the context is legal and precisely that of release 
of an accused person against a bail bond which may, and often does contain non-
pecuniary conditions. Conditions may be temporal, financial or non-financial. All 
conditions form integral parts of a bail bond and are valid prima facie. No 
particular type of condition should be excluded a priori.123 
Judge Anderson concluded that as art 73 contained no ‘explicit restriction 
upon the imposition of non-financial conditions’,124 the correct question is to 
consider whether the bond in all its elements is reasonable.125 Support for this 
view is also found in art 292(3) which stipulates the release is to be ‘without 
prejudice to the merits’ of the case before the domestic courts.126  
After examining the past actions of the Volga, Judge Anderson concluded that 
the good behaviour bond and conditions imposed by Australia were not 
unreasonable within the terms of art 73(2) of UNCLOS.127 These past actions 
included ignoring warnings to stay outside the Australian Fishing Zone and 
evidence that the Volga had operated within a fleet of other fishing vessels 
coordinated from offices in Indonesia and Las Palmas.128 The evidence 
suggested that the Volga might rejoin the fleet after its release by Australian 
authorities. The condition that a VMS be carried on board the Volga was 
designed to deter further illegal fishing after the vessel was released by 
Australian authorities.129  
In light of these factors, Judge Anderson concluded that the conditions 
imposed by Australia in settling the bond under art 73 did not exceed the ‘margin 
of appreciation’130 to be accorded to domestic courts and authorities,131 with the 
element of reasonableness involving their exercise of discretion. International 
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courts have consistently applied the concept of a ‘margin of appreciation’ when 
considering the reasonableness of the exercise of discretion by such bodies.132 
Preference should be given to the approach taken on this point by the 
dissenting judges. Quite rightly, Judge ad hoc Shearer noted that the balance 
struck between the interests of coastal states in managing resources within their 
EEZs and those of flag states over their vessels, established during UNCLOS 
Conference III, need not be ‘preserved exactly as it was conceived’.133 
In relation to the role of the Tribunal in supporting coastal state attempts to 
deter the incidence of illegal fishing, Judge ad hoc Shearer noted that under art 
19(2) of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement,134 the necessity of deterrence is 
specifically recognised. National courts must take into account the gravity of the 
offences committed to set a penalty aimed at deterring further illegal fishing 
activity. Arguably both Australia and France have sought to do this. The role of 
ITLOS then is to ‘be fully aware and supportive of these aims’.135 It follows that 
the bond set under art 73 of UNCLOS ought to reflect the gravity of offences 
committed under national legislation.136  
Arguably, the balance struck during UNCLOS Conference III between coastal 
states and high seas states has been exploited by rogue illegal fishermen. ‘A new 
balance has to be struck between vessel owners, operators and fishing companies 
on the one hand and coastal States on the other’.137 Coastal states would have 
reason to be apprehensive in future prompt release cases before ITLOS, as the 
Tribunal appears to have ignored the evidence of increasingly professional IUU 
fishing operations.138  
5 Excluding IUU Fishers from the Scope of Article 73 
At the 2002 meeting of CCAMLR member states, Australia submitted a 
proposal to amend the application of art 73(2) to ensure that it does not apply to 
vessels or support craft apprehended for IUU fishing within the Convention 
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Area.139 The response to the Australian proposal within CCAMLR, a fisheries 
organisation plagued by IUU fishing since 1997, was decidedly unfavourable. 
Whilst CCAMLR members ‘sympathised with the sentiments’140 expressed by 
Australia, the general consensus was that the balance achieved at UNCLOS 
Conference III between coastal state and high seas fishing states was an essential 
part of the package deal.141 The balance should neither be altered lightly nor 
without further study. The member states also noted that if there are concerns 
with the approach taken by ITLOS, this should be addressed by the Tribunal.142 
Whilst the approaching 10 year anniversary of the entry into force of UNCLOS 
does theoretically provide an opportunity to propose amendments to the 
Convention, in practice it would be very difficult to secure the agreement of all 
UNCLOS member states.  
D Applying the Traditional Doctrine of ‘Hot Pursuit’ 
to Modern Fishing Practices  
1 The Law regarding ‘Hot Pursuit’  
The doctrine of ‘hot pursuit’, codified originally in the 1958 Convention on 
the High Seas143 and subsequently, in UNCLOS, is based upon principles of 
customary international law.144 During the International Law Conference of 
1930, the right of ‘hot pursuit’ by coastal state authorities was generally agreed 
to. This right was in fact included in the 1929 Harvard Draft Convention on 
Territorial Waters, which, as history has shown, was never adopted by the 1930 
Conference parties. 
The exercise of the right of ‘hot pursuit’ infringes on flag state authority on 
the high seas. It enables coastal states to enforce their laws into the high seas, 
provided the violation has occurred within the coastal states’ maritime zones. To 
ensure this infringement does not become a violation of flag state sovereignty 
and is legal under international law, a number of procedural requirements in art 
111 of UNCLOS must be met. In the M/V Saiga (No 2) Case, ITLOS noted that 
‘the conditions for the exercise of the right of hot pursuit … are cumulative. 
Each of them has to be satisfied for the pursuit to be legitimate under the 
Convention’.145 
To protect the interest of flag states further, art 111(8) of UNCLOS stipulates 
that where a ‘ship has been stopped or arrested outside the territorial sea in 
circumstances which do not justify the exercise of the right of hot pursuit, it shall 
be compensated for any loss or damage’. 
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2 Modern Fishing Practices  
Recent practice indicates that flag states have exploited the strict and outdated 
procedural requirements within art 111.146 In seven of the eight arrests of foreign 
fishing vessels by Australian authorities, the Australian Defence Force (primarily 
the Royal Australian Navy or Special Air Service Regiment) has been called 
upon to assist in boarding the vessel. The eighth vessel was arrested with the 
assistance of foreign government forces. Australian civilian patrol vessels, 
manned initially by the Australian Fisheries Management Authority and 
Coastwatch officers, began to carry armed Customs officers in June 2003. 
Despite this move, the inability of these authorities to apprehend illegal vessels 
has been highlighted by three recent ‘hot pursuits’ commenced in Australian 
waters, detailed in Table 2. 
 
TABLE 2: RECENT ‘HOT PURSUITS’ BY AUSTRALIAN PATROL  
VESSELS IN THE SOUTHERN OCEAN147 
 
Vessel Date Length of 
pursuit 
Outcome Nature of any 
assistance 
South 
Tomi 
April 
2001 
3300 nautical 
miles 
(14 days)  
Vessel arrested 320 
nautical miles south of 
Cape Town on  
12 April 2001 and 
escorted to Fremantle, 
Western Australia. 
South African Navy 
assets and personnel 
utilised to make arrest. 
Lena February 
2002 
(14 days) Vessel escaped arrest 
in December 2001 
when civil patrol 
vessel the Southern 
Supporter ran low on 
fuel. 
None.  
Viarsa August 
2003 
3900 nautical 
miles 
(21 days) 
 
Vessel arrested 2000 
nautical miles south 
west of Cape Town 
on 28 August 2003. 
Support provided by 
armed South African 
enforcement officers on 
board the South African 
tug, the John Ross and 
UK fisheries patrol 
vessel, Dorada and the 
South African icebreaker 
the Agulhas during the 
arrest. 
                                                 
 
146
 See generally Craig Allen, ‘Doctrine of Hot Pursuit: A Functional Interpretation Adaptable 
to Emerging Maritime Law Enforcement Technologies and Practices’ (1989) 20 Ocean 
Development and International Law 309, 323–5. The author observed in 1989 that the 
traditional doctrine contains procedural requirements which might be invoked to limit or 
preclude the use of new technologies. 
 
147
 The information in Table 2 was compiled by the author from the following Reports of the 
CCAMLR Commission: Report of Member’s Activities in the Convention Area 2000–2001: 
Australia (2001) [III]; Report of Member’s Activities in the Convention Area 2001–2002: 
Australia (2002) [2]; Report of Member’s Activities in the Convention Area 2002–2003: 
Australia (2003) [2].  
28 Melbourne Journal of International Law [Vol 5 
  
 
In late December 2001, the Lena evaded a civilian patrol vessel for 14 days 
before finally escaping with her allegedly illegal hold of toothfish.148 The Lena 
had been repainted and renamed the Ana when it was finally arrested in February 
2002.149  
The South Tomi was detained after a 14 day pursuit which traversed 3300 
nautical miles across the Southern Indian Ocean. Australian Defence Force 
personnel boarded the vessel south of Cape Town with the assistance of the 
South African navy.150 The Southern Supporter, the civilian patrol vessel pursing 
the South Tomi, had been unable to force the vessel to stop. The government 
officers and civilian crew on board the Southern Supporter were unarmed and 
there was no helicopter boarding capacity.151  
Most recently, the Viarsa was pursued by the Southern Supporter for 21 days 
through treacherous and ice-packed seas.152 When ordered to accompany the 
Southern Supporter, the Customs and Fisheries patrol vessel, to port, the Viarsa 
sailed west towards Cape Horn. Hampered by rough seas and poor weather, 
lightly armed customs officers on board the Southern Supporter were unable to 
effect an arrest.153  
Illegal fishing vessels have demonstrated a willingness to attempt to outrun 
authorities when detected, even if this involves endangering the vessel, crew and 
the valuable catch on board.154 The evidence also suggests that incursions into 
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coastal state waters within the Southern Ocean are highly organised and that 
vessels operate under strict instructions not to surrender unless absolutely 
necessary.155 High value catches of toothfish are at stake, perhaps more valuable 
to the corporate owners than the vessel and the crew.156  
The resistance to surrender unless coastal state vessels demonstrate an ability 
to force surrender creates practical problems for states commencing a ‘hot 
pursuit’. The inhospitable weather conditions and treacherous seas through 
which the pursuits are conducted operate to the advantage of the illegal fishers. 
Boarding by inflatable dinghies requires calm weather and even helicopter 
boarding parties are placed at risk boarding in the rough seas typical of the 
Southern Ocean. 
3 Meeting the Procedural Requirements of Article 111 of UNCLOS 
Several of the requirements in art 111 seem rather straightforward. However, 
although determining whether a foreign ship is within a state’s EEZ might seem 
a simple question of fact, it is often a point of disagreement between the coastal 
state and the flag state. 
This issue was raised in submissions during the Volga Case. Counsel for the 
Australian Government stated that the requirement under art 111(4), that the 
foreign vessel be within the EEZ, is a subjective one. That is, it is for the 
pursuing vessel to satisfy itself that the foreign ship is within the EEZ.157 It was 
argued that there is no requirement to prove as a matter of objective fact that the 
foreign vessel was within the EEZ and as such, the test should ask whether, 
using the practical means available, ‘the coastal state considers the vessel to be 
within the exclusive economic zone. If this is the case, that is sufficient for a 
valid pursuit to have commenced’.158 
The argument was put by Australia in response to the assertion by Russia, the 
flag state of the Volga, that for the purposes of satisfying art 111, the foreign ship 
must be within the EEZ (or other maritime zone according to the particular facts) 
when the ‘hot pursuit’ commences.159 However, the issue was not considered in 
the majority ITLOS judgment.160 In the absence of guidance from ITLOS, the 
better conclusion would be to interpret the wording of art 111(4) to accept any 
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reasonable evidence tendered by the pursuing state as to how it became satisfied 
that the foreign ship was within its relevant maritime zone. 
Other requirements within art 111 are more problematic. This is due in part to 
the fact that some of the terms utilised within art 111 have not been defined 
within UNCLOS. One of the most critical words within art 111, in terms of 
fisheries enforcement, is the word ‘interrupted’. In the current environment 
where illegal vessels are increasingly opting to attempt to outrun a patrol vessel, 
the requirement for the pursuit to continue uninterrupted is crucial. In the 
absence of a settled definition, demonstrating that a pursuit has not been 
interrupted can be difficult. Over a lengthy ‘hot pursuit’ such as the 3300 
nautical mile pursuit of the South Tomi or the 3900 nautical mile pursuit of the 
Viarsa, there may be many opportunities to argue that the pursuit has been 
interrupted. For example the coastal state vessel may lose audio or visual contact 
but maintain radar contact at all times. The question then becomes does the 
traditional doctrine of ‘hot pursuit’ allow the pursuit to be maintained by the 
radar surveillance? 
In this context, s 101B(4) of the Fisheries Management Act 1991 (Cth) seeks 
to clarify the law on ‘hot pursuit’. The sub-paragraph states that ‘[f]or the 
purposes of paragraph 3(a), a pursuit of a boat is not interrupted merely because 
some or all of the officers pursuing the boat lose sight of it or trace of it on a 
radar or other sensing device’. 
Another potential difficulty faced by pursuing states in the 21st century is the 
requirement in art 111(4) that a visual or auditory signal, detectable by the 
foreign ship be given before the pursuit is commenced. During submissions in 
the Volga Case, evidence was produced to support the fact that a radio broadcast 
was made to the Volga by an Australian military helicopter, despatched from 
HMAS Canberra.161 Similarly, the crew on board the South Tomi was contacted 
via phone and radio.162 In the M/V Saiga (No 2) Case,  Judge Anderson, in a 
separate opinion, considered radio messages broadcast over 40 nautical miles. In 
this context, he stated, ‘even if the Tribunal had been willing to accept in 
principle to consider the possibility of accepting as an auditory signal a radio 
message sent over 40 miles or so … there is no evidence of it being sent or 
received’.163 
Recent state practice, however, would suggest at minimum, the scope of art 
111(4) includes a radio broadcast as a signal to stop. Radio signals were utilised 
in the pursuits of the South Tomi and the Viarsa. Further, the ILC observed, in 
relation to the form of ‘hot pursuit’ for art 23 of the Geneva Convention on the 
High Seas, that ‘[t]he important point was the fundamental right to give the order 
to stop and to undertake hot pursuit, not the specific means by which the right 
was exercised’.164 It is unclear whether the wording of art 111(4) would extend 
to communications via email or facsimile. 
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Under art 111(3), the ‘hot pursuit’ is deemed to cease if the foreign ship enters 
the territorial sea of another state. Although this may not appear to be an issue 
for pursuits conducted in the expansive Southern Ocean, it was of real concern to 
Australian authorities in 2001 when pursuing the South Tomi.165 It has been 
suggested that a ‘short stay or passage of the pursued vessel through the 
territorial waters of a State, obviously undertaken with the intention of evading 
the law, does not preclude the resumption of hot pursuit’.166 The basis for this 
proposition is that the pursued vessel is seeking to ‘take advantage unjustifiably 
of a situation laid down in law’, and therefore the activity should be ‘deprived of 
its legal consequences’.167  
Another option for discounting the entry into the territorial waters of another 
state might be realised under the umbrella of cooperative regionalism. For 
example, the bilateral treaty signed between France and Australia in late 2003168 
provides, inter alia, for prior authorisation to continue the ‘hot pursuit’ through 
the territorial sea of the other state, provided the other party is informed and no 
physical law enforcement or other coercive action is taken against the vessel 
pursued whilst in the territorial waters.169  
Another requirement for a validly conducted ‘hot pursuit’ is that it must be 
conducted by a clearly marked government aircraft or vessel. Article 111(6) of 
UNCLOS allows a handover from a government aircraft which commences the 
pursuit and gives the order to stop, to another government aircraft or ship.170 The 
article is silent on the handover of the pursuit from one government vessel to 
another, that is, from a civilian patrol vessel such as the Southern Supporter to a 
military vessel with the capacity to force the pursued vessel to stop. This is 
exactly what did happen with the pursuits of the South Tomi and the Viarsa, with 
the subsequent vessels joining in the pursuit also flying the flags of other states. 
The better view would be to interpret art 111 as requiring only that the pursuit 
be uninterrupted. Should additional government vessels join the pursuit and 
assist in bringing it to a conclusion, the requirements of art 111 remain satisfied. 
This is the view taken by other authors171 and the interpretation given to the 
1929 ‘hot pursuit’ of the vessel The I am Alone. In that instance a second US 
vessel joined the pursuit of the Canadian vessel, and although the second vessel 
joined the pursuit from a different direction, the US argued that it was a valid 
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continuation of the original pursuit.172 The question of the relay of vessels in a 
‘hot pursuit’ was not discussed at the international level until the ILC reviewed 
the issue in 1955. Although there was some disagreement about the validity of 
relaying vessels,173 the ILC finally voted in favour of recognising such an event. 
Such an interpretation supports the circumstances of the arrest of the South 
Tomi in April 2001. Unable to convince or force the Master of the South Tomi to 
stop, the civilian patrol vessel the Southern Supporter called for assistance from 
the Australian authorities. Contact with the South Tomi was maintained by the 
Southern Supporter and daily calls were made repeating the order to stop.174 
Given that Australian naval vessels docked in Fremantle could not catch up with 
the ‘hot pursuit’, Australian Defence Force personnel were flown to Cape Town, 
South Africa, from where they boarded a South African naval vessel. The South 
Tomi was then arrested by a boarding party south of Cape Town and outside the 
South African territorial sea.175 Similar circumstances arose during the arrest of 
the Viarsa. The assistance of South African and British vessels brought a 21 day 
‘hot pursuit’ to a close.176  
The law on ‘hot pursuit’ has not been fully considered by ITLOS. However, 
the cumulative elements of a valid pursuit under art 111 provide IUU fishers 
with opportunities to challenge the individual details of a pursuit. There have 
been murmurs of dissent in the M/V Saiga (No 1) Case and the Volga Case, and 
it is only a matter of time until a flag state is requested to lend its name to an 
ITLOS application in relation to the interpretation of art 111. In light of the 
approach taken by ITLOS in construing art 73 narrowly, and in placing little 
weight in the powerful evidence of IUU fishing, coastal states should take the 
necessary steps to ensure art 111 is complied with to the letter. 
V STRATEGIES FOR MINIMISING IUU FISHING 
It is evident that strategies for minimising IUU fishing should accommodate 
the forces currently shaping marine fisheries. As outlined earlier in this article, 
the increased pressure on high seas fisheries caused by the relocation of high 
seas fishing vessels and the increased efficiency of fishing vessels are 
exacerbated by an over capacity in the global fishing fleet. IUU fishing has been 
an inevitable byproduct of increased competition for dwindling resources. Whilst 
it is probable that the practice of IUU fishing will never be completely 
eliminated, several strategies currently employed by the CCAMLR Commission 
are proving effective in reducing its incidence. 
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The requirement for flag state consent minimises the range of effective 
strategies that may be employed to deter IUU fishing. Whilst the limitations in 
the existing international law of the sea primarily affect coastal state efforts to 
curb illegal fishing, they are nevertheless a relevant factor to be considered in 
identifying alternative strategies. The options listed below do not depend on flag 
state consent and, when applied uniformly, have the potential to remove the 
economic incentives for pursuing IUU fishing. In addition to the listed options, 
RFMOs and coastal states have benefited from the exchange of information, the 
use of non-governmental and legitimate fishing industry information, publicity 
and diplomatic approaches. 
A Port and Market State Controls  
As a general rule of international law, states have jurisdiction over vessels in 
their ports.177 This principle of customary international law has been reflected in 
many international agreements. For example, UNCLOS, the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement, IPOA-IUU and the CCAMLR (through conservation measures and 
Resolutions) contain references to port state controls178 and are evidence of state 
practice of increased use of such controls to regulate the activities of vessels in 
port. 
Port states may require that the vessel Master submit the fishing vessel and 
documents to inspection as a condition of entry to port. Existing International 
Maritime Organization (‘IMO’) Memorandums of Understanding regulate vessel 
safety, pollution and crew living and working conditions. The Joint FAO/IMO ad 
hoc Working Group on IUU Fishing and Related Matters agreed that the FAO 
‘should consider the need to develop measures for port State control’.179 This 
would involve a harmonised system of port state measures, designed to facilitate 
a coordinated approach to preventing, deterring and eliminating IUU fishing. 
A draft Memorandum on Port State Measures has been developed under the 
auspices of the FAO.180 It addresses a number of issues including:  
• A requirement that the foreign fishing vessel provide advance 
notification of its intention to seek port access. The notification is to 
be accompanied by details of the vessel’s identity, fishing licence, 
nature of the fishing trip and fish on board;  
• The obligation on port states to refuse port access to vessels that have 
engaged in IUU fishing, including known offenders. (The use of a 
vessel of noncompliance database is complementary to this aspect of 
port state control); and  
• Port inspections of vessels and documentation. The CCAMLR Catch 
Documentation Scheme, which has been continually refined since its 
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adoption in 1999, provides an existing working model for this aspect 
of port state control. 
Under the CCAMLR Catch Documentation Scheme, member and non-member 
states are encouraged to implement controls on the landing of and world trade in, 
toothfish, whether caught within or outside the Convention Area. With the 
announcement by the Canadian delegation at the 2003 CCAMLR meeting that 
their Government was in a position to implement the Catch Documentation 
Scheme, all member states now comply with the Scheme.181 In addition, a 
number of non-member states also apply the CCAMLR Catch Documentation 
Scheme.182 
Whilst port state controls can be implemented on a regional basis through 
RFMOs, vessels flagged to non-member states can visit the ports of other 
non-members and thereby avoid the regional controls. This may lead to new 
‘open ports’ being developed outside the geographical reach of RFMOs. The 
CCAMLR has had a degree of success in encouraging non-member states to 
implement the Catch Documentation Scheme, effectively widening the circle of 
ports and thus enhancing the effectiveness of the Scheme in regulating IUU 
fishing. However, CCAMLR has also experienced the development of new ‘open 
port’ states such as Jakarta and Mozambique, both of which have been 
approached to implement the Catch Documentation Scheme.183  
Market state controls operate on a similar basis to port state controls. By 
regulating the import and export of toothfish and toothfish products, states can 
potentially restrict the movement of any product with IUU origins. Australia was 
successful in 2003 in encouraging the US to seize a shipment of 31 tonnes of 
toothfish bound for US markets. The shipment was traced to the Arvisa 1, and 
Australia was concerned that the vessel had been engaging in IUU fishing.184  
The effective implementation of port state controls may provide market states 
with some measure of comfort that imported toothfish have been caught in 
accordance with the conservation measures either of coastal states or of RFMOs. 
However, this does not lessen the need for uniform market state controls. 
Operating as a second line of regulation, market state controls can contribute to the 
prevention, deterrence and elimination of IUU fishing for straddling fish stocks. 
B IUU Vessel Database 
In 2002 the CCAMLR Commission agreed to confer upon the Secretariat the 
task of establishing two IUU vessel databases. Both were to list flags of 
noncompliance vessels, with the two lists separating non-member and member 
flagged vessels. 
The establishment of these ‘black lists’ or IUU Vessel Lists has been 
controversial. There are evidentiary problems with establishing that a vessel is a 
vessel of noncompliance, as well as significant financial consequences flowing 
from listing. An IUU Vessel List may have a similar effect to the Contaminated 
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Land Registers employed by some governments in seeking to manage the 
economic cost of land pollution. The value of land merely listed for investigation 
for a possible listing on the Contaminated Land Register, falls immediately. 
Similarly, a nomination for inclusion on the IUU Vessel List can damage a 
vessel’s reputation and have an impact on its ability to land and transfer catches, 
given the proposed obligation on port states to deny port access to known IUU 
offenders. The CCAMLR Commission is still working through the issue of 
requirements for, and the practicalities of, listing.  
To facilitate cooperative regionalism, an FAO-sponsored, centrally managed 
IUU Vessel List would provide an effective means of regulating vessel activity 
as it would allow any coastal state or RFMO to search for new vessels entering 
their area of regulation. The globalisation of IUU fishing means that vessels can 
move between regional fisheries and take advantage of a lack of information 
exchange between coastal states or RFMOs. Additionally, an FAO-sponsored list 
would enable a uniform approach to the listing and delisting of vessels. Finally, 
the support of the FAO would provide credibility which is currently lacking in 
the lists compiled by Greenpeace and the Coalition of Legal Toothfish Operators. 
However there are practical difficulties with pursuing an FAO sponsored list. 
Apart from issues of funding and membership of any subcommittee, the main 
obstacle to a centralised IUU Vessel List is state consent. This issue of consent 
currently plagues the CCAMLR IUU Vessel Lists. Both Russia and Spain voiced 
concerns with the CCAMLR system of listing at the 2003 meeting. The Russian 
delegate stated that the rights and duties of the flag state had been violated.185 
Interestingly, neither Russia nor Spain was concerned about the IUU List for 
non-member states. 
Whilst the actual listing of a flag of noncompliance vessel does not require 
flag state consent, the establishment of an IUU Vessel List does require state 
support. Hence, RFMOs do need to be sensitive to members’ concerns about the 
factual evidence required before a listing can be made. 
C Cooperative Surveillance and Enforcement  
The necessity for a coordinated approach to surveillance is emphasised by the 
nature of IUU fishing. As one observer has stated, ‘[w]e are talking about highly 
organised criminal syndicates. They’re very very difficult to pin down. They’re 
very liquid in their approach’.186 
To this end, France and Australia signed a bilateral treaty for cooperative 
surveillance in their Southern Ocean EEZs in late 2003.187 This Treaty has been 
negotiated over a number of years and represents a significant step towards 
achieving effective management of the remote Australian and French EEZs. The 
preamble to the Treaty notes that ‘cooperative action between the parties should 
encompass cooperative surveillance and law enforcement operations, including 
through developing further agreements or arrangements’. 
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Not only does the Treaty provide for cooperative surveillance, it states that 
either party may request the assistance of the other party when engaged in a ‘hot 
pursuit’.188 The Treaty also facilitates the exchange of information on such 
details as the location or movement of fishing vessels (including licensed 
vessels) within the Treaty area.189 Finally, the Treaty does contemplate the 
negotiation of further agreements for law enforcement operations.190 
Encouragingly, Australia and South Africa are engaged in bilateral 
negotiations aimed at achieving greater cooperation between the respective 
governments and joint responsibility in patrolling and protectin marine resources 
in their Southern Ocean EEZs.191 The enhanced cooperation between either 
coastal states or RFMO states can positively impact on efforts to deter and 
eliminate IUU fishing via port and market controls and IUU vessel databases. 
VI CONCLUSION  
A number of developments have shaped the practice of IUU fishing and these 
have been reviewed in this article. Together these developments have created an 
economic, political and legal environment in which the emergence of IUU 
fishing was inevitable. In fact, IUU fishing has become one of the single biggest 
threats to the sustainable management of high seas and coastal state fisheries. Its 
persistence has prompted global reactions in the form of the IPOA-IUU192 and 
OECD Workshop on IUU Fishing. Regionally, RFMOs such as the CCAMLR 
Commission are actively pursuing strategies to curb the growth of IUU fishing. 
Coastal state authorities are facing similar pressures to take effective action 
against illegal fishing and are even more hamstrung by the limitations in 
international law as identified in Part IV. The significant limitations in the 
application of arts 73 and 111 of UNCLOS are, in theory, able to be addressed at 
the 10th anniversary of the entry into force of UNCLOS later this year. However, 
any amendment which further increases coastal state authority at the expense of 
the freedom of high seas fishing states is likely to be interpreted as evidence of 
‘creeping’ coastal state jurisdiction rather than a legitimate attempt to close legal 
loopholes being taken advantage of by IUU fishers. 
The historical factors which created the existing legal framework for fisheries 
management under UNCLOS must be accommodated by future management 
plans. It might be possible to ease global fishing fleet numbers gradually. 
However, the efficiency of the fishing vessels and the impact of their relocation 
to the marine areas beyond the 200 mile EEZs are permanent factors in the 
marine fishing industry. There is potential to address the legal limitations 
identified in Part IV through the adoption of measures which do not require flag 
state consent. If effective, these measures could minimise the economic 
incentives for IUU fishing and its appeal could thus be diminished. 
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